日韓慰安婦合意の悲哀 箱田哲也 — 2019年12月29日

日韓慰安婦合意の悲哀 箱田哲也

(社説余滴)日韓慰安婦合意の悲哀 箱田哲也

2019年12月29日

日本と韓国が交わした何とも不憫(ふびん)な約束である。

 ちょうど4年前の昨日、両政府が発表した慰安婦問題の合意のことだ。

 「合意は違憲」と反発する元慰安婦らの訴えは一昨日、韓国の憲法裁判所で却下された。だがそんな判断を待つまでもなく、すでに日韓両政府によって骨抜きにされてしまっている。

 韓国の文在寅(ムンジェイン)政権には、前政権が元慰安婦らの声に耳を傾けずに発表を強行したとの誤解がある。実際には政府当局者が十数回、被害者側と会い、意見を交渉にも反映させたが、文政権は被害者らのケアにあたる財団を解散させた。

 韓国では、日本に出し抜かれたのでは、との疑心が今も渦巻く。だが当時、合意案の承認を最後まで渋ったのは、韓国大統領府ではなく安倍首相の方だった。

 合意は過去に例を見ないほど明確に、日本政府の責任や謝罪、反省をうたう。

 それがよほど屈辱的だったのか。日本側は譲った部分を強調すまいと腐心した結果、心通わぬ契りと受け取られて漂流。首相が最もこだわった日本大使館前の像の撤去も遠のいた。

 そもそもこの合意は公式の当局間協議ではなく、両首脳の意を受けた交渉団が人知れず韓国のある都市で接触を重ね、結実させた。

 ナショナリズムを刺激する敏感な問題だけに静かな環境が必要だったことに加え、両政府内に存在した交渉の妨げになりうる人物の介入を避けるためだ。

 米国の仲介でなく、日韓間で独自にまとめた点でも歴史的と言える。

 慰安婦の実態は明らかになっていないことが多い。せっかくの汗の結晶だけに本来なら真相究明などの起点とすべきだったが、事態は逆の方向に進んだ。

 とりわけ韓国では陳腐な勝ち負け論や国内の「世論」にもまれ、にわかに色あせていった。

 不幸な過去を背景にした二つの国が和解することの重みと難しさを、慰安婦合意は示している。

 4年という歳月は、両国が少しは冷静に思考できる時間となっただろうか。

 目下、政府間の最大懸案である徴用工問題は、ついに越年することになった。その解決策をさぐる上でも慰安婦合意が残した教訓は多いと思う。

 (はこだてつや 国際社説担当)

https://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3S14311947.html?_requesturl=articles%2FDA3S14311947.html&pn=4

「反日種族主義」の共同著者、ソウルで襲われる — 2019年12月18日

「反日種族主義」の共同著者、ソウルで襲われる

「反日種族主義」の共同著者、ソウルで襲われる
2019.12.18 産経

 【ソウル=名村隆寛】日韓でベストセラーとなった「反日種族主義」の共同著者で、韓国・落星台(ナクソンデ)経済研究所の李宇衍(イウヨン)研究委員が18日、ソウルの日本大使館近くで集会を開いていたところ、サングラスの男に襲われた。警備中の警察官が男を制止し事情聴取した。李氏にけがはなかった。

 李氏は、韓国で浸透している「日本軍慰安婦は性奴隷」などの主張が、事実に反しているとの立場。大使館前に設置されている慰安婦像の撤去と大使館前で開かれていた日本政府糾弾集会の中止を求め、数十メートル離れた歩道で数人の支援者と集会を開いている最中に襲われた。

 男は李氏に近寄ると、突然、素手で襲いかかった。警察官に引き離されたが、「こいつ(李氏)を殺しに来た!」と何度も叫んだ。

 周辺には李氏らの活動を批判する市民やメディアが集まっており、現場は一時騒然となった。李氏はその場で被害を訴え、警察は男と李氏を警察署に移動させて事情を聴いた。

 李氏らは、今月4日から反日糾弾集会と同じ時間に集会を開いており、18日が3回目。この日も、李氏に対し「おまえはゴミだ!」「いくら日本からカネをもらったんだ」などの罵声が執拗(しつよう)に浴びせられ、集会はさながら李氏を糾弾する場となった。

 非難の的となった李氏だが「むしろ我々の主張に社会の関心が集まっている」と意に介しておらず、今後も集会を続ける構えだ。

https://www.sankei.com/world/news/191218/wor1912180016-n1.html

「安倍は慰安婦は嘘つきだと言った」エコノミスト — 2019年12月16日

「安倍は慰安婦は嘘つきだと言った」エコノミスト

Japan’s prime minister
Scarcely an Abe-rration
The prime minister’s latest—and most offensive—gaffe is all too typical 

Mar 8th 2007 edition

THE gossip-mill is grinding away, and the man whose career could soon pop out the other end in fragments is none other than Shinzo Abe. When he was elected leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and hence as Japan’s prime minister, last September he won by a landslide, and was hailed as a youthful (52), electorally savvy representative of a new political generation, and, moreover, as one likely to carry on the reform programme associated with his charismatic predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. Mr Abe began in spectacular fashion, visiting Beijing and Seoul during his first days in office and thus warming up relations that had become damagingly frosty under Mr Koizumi. Since then, however, the only spectacular feature has been his decline.

That decline may explain why on March 1st Mr Abe chose to undo much of what he had achieved through his October visits to Beijing and Seoul, by publicly denying one of the many Chinese and Korean grievances: that Japan’s Imperial Army forced hundreds of thousands of women, mostly Chinese and Korean, into prostitution during the 1930s and 1940s.

Not all of those euphemistically termed “comfort women” were enslaved: some were already prostitutes, and others had been sold into bondage by their families. But many say they were kidnapped, enslaved and raped. Their testimony, plus documents unearthed in military archives, forced the Japanese government in 1993 to acknowledge responsibility. Now Mr Abe has said that there is no “historical proof” that coercion was involved. In other words, that the women are liars.

This revealed Mr Abe’s true colours, as a conservative politician who has long taken a revisionist view of Japan’s 20th-century history. The statement was prompted by an effort by fellow LDP conservatives to force a bill through the Diet (parliament) overturning the government’s 1993 statement (which the Diet never ratified). They were responding to moves in America’s Congress to condemn Japan over the sex-slavery issue. A strong prime minister might have resisted taking a position on such a sensitive matter. Mr Abe, however, is desperate to shore up his party base.

After his groundbreaking visits to China and South Korea last October, and no doubt helped by North Korea’s nuclear test the very day he left Beijing, the new prime minister’s approval rating was in the high 70s. Now it has slumped below 40%. That is far from disastrous, by the low standards of the ten forgettable prime ministers Japan endured between 1987 and 2001. But it is poor by the standards of the starry Mr Koizumi, who took office in that year and remained popular for most of his five-year term. And it is dangerous for two bigger reasons: there are local elections for prefectural governors and city mayors in April, and a critical set of elections for parliament’s Upper House in July, in which the government’s majority could be at stake; and there is a mood for revenge among the many older Liberal Democrats who feel Mr Abe leapfrogged them to gain the leadership last September.

The Japanese public has turned against Mr Abe not because of foreign policy or historical debates but for economic reasons. For all the government’s boasts that Japan is enjoying its longest period of growth since 1945, the Japanese are not feeling much benefit in their purses and wallets. The boast is true only if you ignore deflation, and while ordinary Japanese like falling prices, they do not like the fact that their incomes have risen only slowly—as much because of longer hours worked as because of higher wages. In nominal terms (ie, not adjusted for price changes), Japanese output remains below that of 1997. Recent economic growth has produced record company profits, but a tight labour market has not seen wages rise much. In this respect, things were no better under Mr Koizumi, but at least he seemed to be doing something about it by shaking things up. By comparison, Mr Abe looks clueless.

Dreaming of Lionheart
Actually, his problem is subtler than mere cluelessness. He is torn between dealing with the politically potent topic of inequality—in an ageing Japan, the income gap is widening—and making further reforms to encourage future growth. The only thing he has done so far has made both problems worse, however: his government clamped down on the interest rates chargeable by consumer-finance companies on loans to Japan’s poorest borrowers. This looked popular, but some say it has choked off their borrowing and helped to depress consumer spending.

Worse still, when he has had a political clue it has led him in the wrong direction. Mr Koizumi pulled off the remarkable trick of attacking his own political party, eventually kicking out LDP Diet members when they rebelled against his flagship programme of postal privatisation. That laid the ground for his triumph in the 2005 general election. Mr Abe, keen to curry favour with his party’s old guard, has now readmitted 11 of the rebels. At a stroke, that has changed his public odour from breath of fresh air to the usual LDP halitosis.

Whether he will actually be dumped, however, depends on how badly the LDP fares in the July Upper House elections. Fortunately for Mr Abe, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan is also in disarray, with its leader, Ichiro Ozawa, in poor health and at war with his own colleagues. Yet that may not save Mr Abe, such is the mood against him. Strange stories have been circulating about how cabinet ministers have so little respect for him that they do not bother to stand up when he enters the room. The rival most often mentioned as his budding successor is Taro Aso, the bumptious foreign minister, who is also a conservative and currently cuts a more dashing figure than his boss.

Another name, though, is increasingly being whispered: Junichiro Koizumi. There is no real prospect of tempting him back, at least not yet, for the great man is said to be having far too much fun as Japan’s most eligible bachelor. But how he is missed.

This article appeared in the Asia section of the print edition under the headline “Scarcely an Abe-rration”

https://web.archive.org/web/20191216100302/https://www.economist.com/asia/2007/03/08/scarcely-an-abe-rration